First, the origins and concept of the Hague Convention will be considered along with the idea of the interface between the international litigation regimes of the Recast Regulation and the Hague Convention which have been coordinated through a 'disconnection clause' 8 choosing either the European or the international instrument to govern the transnational private dispute. 9 Moreover, some preliminary remarks about the classification of exclusive choice of court agreements under the Hague Convention will serve as an effective prelude to an outline of the scope and defining characteristics of the Hague Convention. This will be followed by an in-depth examination of anti-suit injunctions to uphold exclusive choice of court agreements and concurrent proceedings under the Hague Convention and in intra-EU Hague Convention cases. The various strands of the argument are drawn together and assessed in the conclusion. The article will try to give an early view on the implications for the topics under discussion of the UK leaving the EU at some point in the future as a result of the majority vote in the EU referendum in the UK in June 2016 to leave the EU.
B. The concept of the Hague Convention, conflicts of international litigation regimes and the classification of choice of court agreements
The origins of the Hague Convention lie in the efforts to salvage something from the wreckage of the most ambitious project undertaken by the Hague Conference on Private
International Law 10 -The Hague Judgments Convention, (a failed global attempt at a 'mixed' convention). 11 The Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements is designed to create a 8 See Art 26(6) of the Hague Convention. 9 See Jan-Jaap Kuipers, EU Law and Private International Law: The Interrelationship in Contractual Obligations (Brill, 2011) 18, notes that the coherence of Union law is protected by the disconnection clause, which provides that Member States shall apply the international instrument externally, but amongst each other the Union rules. Therefore, the disconnection clause allocates or distributes regulatory authority between the EU and the global framework governing exclusive choice of court agreements and furthers the cause of the unification of private international law rules. 10 The Hague Conference of Private International Law is an international intergovernmental organization facilitating the negotiation and conclusion of international multilateral conventions on private international law. It was founded in 1893 and according to Art 1 of the Statute of the Hague Conference on Private International Law its purpose is to 'work for the progressive unification of the rules of private international law '. 11 In 2012, the Council on General Affairs <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2025616> accessed 27 May 2016: Mills classifies 'conflicts of conflict of laws' as 'tertiary rules' because they operate at a level higher than private international law rules which he terms 'secondary rules' dealing with the allocation of regulatory authority in (primary) substantive private law; multilateral and 'multi-speed' 16 regional and international legal order. According to the Hague Convention, the Convention will take precedence over the Recast Regulation if there is an actual incompatibility between the two instruments but excluding the situations where the parties reside exclusively within EU Member States and where recognition or enforcement of a judgment by an EU court is being sought within the EU. 17 Briggs briefly discusses the possible impact of the Hague Convention in the concluding chapter of his monograph on jurisdiction and choice of law agreements. 18 He is critical of the exclusion of non-exclusive choice of court agreements from the scope of the Convention rejects any scope for court discretion in the Convention text. He even extends such inflexible reasoning to a court enforcing a judgment regardless of whether a ground of non-recognition is available. It is submitted that there is no support for such an assertion in the text of Art 9 of the Convention, the Official Explanatory Report or the travaux préparatoires leading up to the conclusion of the Convention. 21 Briggs, Agreements (supra n 18) 531-532. effects from the arguably extrinsic scope that a Convention premised on a system of partial or qualified mutual trust must be taken into account. 22 Before delving into the issues of whether a jurisdiction agreement can be reinforced by national private law remedies, whether it can be binding on the parties as a contractual agreement even if it is ineffective under the Convention and the interplay between the Hague Convention and the Recast Regulation, it is necessary to highlight the scope and the defining characteristics of the Convention.
C. Scope of the Hague Convention
The 
D. Defining characteristics of the Hague Convention
The basic principles of the Hague Convention can be summarised in a few sentences. 27 The chosen court in an exclusive choice of court agreement shall have jurisdiction to decide a dispute which falls within its purview, unless the agreement is null and void under the law of 22 For the concept of a system of 'qualified' or 'partial' mutual trust permitting remedies for breach of exclusive jurisdiction agreements see, infra n 67-70. 23 Art 1(1) of the Hague Convention; See Schulz (supra n 12) 248-250; Brand and Herrup (supra n 11) Chapter 4; Thiele (supra n 11) 67-73. 24 Case C-116/02 Erich Gasser Gmbh v MISAT Srl [2003] ECR I-14693. The CJEU decided that the court first seised (Italy) should determine whether the choice of court agreement giving exclusive jurisdiction to the Austrian courts was valid and applicable to the case. The Austrian courts were obliged to wait for the decision of the Italian court on its jurisdiction, even if it were to take many years, before they could hear the case. 41 Arts 5 and 6 of the Hague Convention. court must normally decline to exercise jurisdiction. 42 The 46 For the scope for pre-emptive litigation on the threshold issue and the court first seised's need to establish whether its duty to stay proceedings is engaged in the different context of Article 31(2) of the Brussels I Recast Regulation, see Fentiman, ibid, 100. international commercial transactions. 47 Although there is no requirement that the parties should have equal rights, it was agreed by the Diplomatic Session that, in order to be covered by the Hague Convention, the agreement must be exclusive irrespective of the party bringing the proceedings. 48 Moreover, the grounds for displacing an agreement provided in the Hague Convention also offer significant opportunities to undermine a jurisdiction agreement, and to create uncertainty as to their status. Despite the enhancement of the enforcement of choice of court agreements in some cases, the potential for tactical forum shopping remains along with the burden on a defendant in foreign proceedings to mount a defence and incur costs and expenses in those proceedings.
The lack of a lis alibi pendens mechanism 49 or a court first seised rule to coordinate proceedings and the apparent tolerance of 'parallel proceedings' 50 suggests that the Hague Convention does not adhere to the strict multilateral jurisdiction and judgments model of the Brussels I Regulation premised on the mutual trust principle. Therefore, the issue of whether national private law remedies such as anti-suit injunctions and damages for breach of choice of court agreements might be relied upon may receive a different answer under the Hague Convention than under Brussels I.
The use of the word 'agreement', the specific provision for the principle of severability along with a choice of law rule for the substantive validity of a jurisdiction agreement in the Hague Convention lends support to arguments in favour of an essentially contractual justification for choice of court agreements. The referral of issues relating to material validity, a substantive element of a jurisdiction agreement, to the law of the chosen forum including its private international law rules recognises the complex 'hybrid' nature of a choice of court agreement incorporating a mix of substantive and procedural components. 
F. Exclusive choice of court agreements and concurrent proceedings in intra-EU Hague

Convention cases
Following the conclusion and ratification of the Lugano Convention (2007) (supra n 45) 118, alludes to the possibility that the party relying on the exclusive jurisdiction agreement could elect not to initiate protective proceedings under Art 31(2) in the agreed court and rely instead on an action in damages. However, it should be noted that the availability of damages in such cases is speculative and might not be permitted by the CJEU because the party relying on the jurisdiction agreement has failed to take advantage of the systemic solution provided by the Recast Regulation of seising the chosen court before the court first seised has adjudicated on the applicability and validity of the jurisdiction agreement. 97 In the context of Art 31 (2) It should be noted that the application of the reverse lis pendens rule in Article 31 (2) of the Recast Regulation will substantially reduce the chances of a non-chosen court in the EU ruling on the validity and applicability of an exclusive jurisdiction agreement if the chosen court has been seised.
The entry into force of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements is a major step towards increased legal security for European companies conducting business in non-EU Contracting States. 99 However, the actual success of the Hague Convention will depend on further ratifications by the major centres for international litigation. Union decided to approve the Convention in 2014 it seems almost certain that post-BREXIT the UK will choose to remain a party to the Hague Convention. The UK may have to ratify or accede to the Convention itself once it is no longer a Member State of the EU but it will surely do so in a way that avoids any break in the Convention's application. BREXIT will almost certainly see the end of the application of the Brussels I Recast in the UK and although it is outside the scope of this article it seems highly unlikely that either the Brussels Convention or the Lugano Convention will remain in force for the UK. 101 Therefore the likely outcome post-BREXIT is that the regime applicable between the UK and the EU (apart from Denmark 102 ) in relation to exclusive choice of court agreements within the scope of the Hague Convention will be the Hague Convention. The UK will be able to grant anti-suit injunctions to uphold exclusive choice of court agreements in favour of the courts in the UK even when one of the parties has brought an action contrary to that agreement in an EU Member State. 103 The EU Member State will apply Article 6 of the Hague Convention rather than Article 31(2) of the Brussels I Regulation Recast when deciding whether to decline jurisdiction in favour of the chosen court(s) in the UK.
101 Those issues are discussed by Dickinson, supra n 83. In relation to exclusive choice of court agreements the Brussels Convention and the Lugano Convention both have the severe drawback that the Gasser case (supra n 40) still applies and the chosen court cannot proceed to hear the case while a first seised non-chosen court in a Contracting State to the Brussels or Lugano Convention is hearing the case. 102 Though it is hoped that before too long Denmark will ratify the Hague Convention. 103 The statement in the text should be qualified by saying that it is possible that Scotland may choose after BREXIT to mirror the Brussels I Regulation regime unilaterally even if it cannot remain a party to the Regulation or the Brussels or Lugano Conventions and hence Scottish courts may respect the CJEU ban on anti-suit injunctions (interdicts of foreign actions as they are called in Scotland, see P Beaumont and P McEleavy, Anton's Private International Law (3 rd edn, SULI/W Green, 2011) 367-371) in cases involving EU Member States even where the Hague Convention applies.
